Effect of Joint Accounts with Right of Survivorship in Washington by Lyness, Virginia B.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 37 
Number 1 Symposium: Joint Tenancy 
4-1-1962 
Effect of Joint Accounts with Right of Survivorship in Washington 
Virginia B. Lyness 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Virginia B. Lyness, Comment, Effect of Joint Accounts with Right of Survivorship in Washington, 37 Wash. 
L. Rev. 88 (1962). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol37/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENT
EFFECT OF JOINT ACCOUNTS WITH RIGHT OF
SURVIVORSHIP IN WASHINGTON
The recent passage in Washington of Initiative No. 208 providing
for creation of joint tenancies in real and personal property provides
the occasion for a reconsideration of the current status of the statutory
and case law in Washington relating to the effect given to "joint
tenancy" accounts with right of survivorship. Such an account1 typi-
cally takes the form of a deposit opened in the name of the depositor
and another, payable to either or to the survivor. Does such an account,
by virtue of present statutes, in fact create a joint tenancy with all
its incidents as known to the common law? Or does it assume a
modified form, with unique characteristics, distinguishable from com-
mon law concepts? If the latter is true, what impact, if any, may the
new enactment2 have on expectable results under the present holdings?
The prevalence of accounts of the type under discussion indicates that
the answers to these questions, in terms of practical result, may be
of importance to a substantial number of people.
The joint account with right of survivorship, if used with an aware-
ness of its inherent anomalies, contains the potential for consider-
able utility to those wishing to accomplish the transfer of a beneficial
interest in a fund on deposit, at the death of the depositor, while
retaining the right during life to draw upon such sums at will.' That
such purpose has occasionally been denied effectuation is due in some
part at least to a general haze of confusion, beclouding court, counsel
and co-depositors4 alike, as to the basic nature of such accounts. The
variant theories, upon which the survivorship element of multi-party
accounts is sought to be sustained, offer further proof that the area
is one which eludes simple definition.'
I In the interest of brevity, the terms "account" and "depositor" as used in this
comment refer inclusively to commercial and savings bank accounts, savings and loan
association shares, and credit union shares. The substantive differences, while not
germane to the topic herein considered, should nonetheless be kept in mind.
2 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2.
3 See, e.g., Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUm.
L. REv. 103 (1953).
4 It is obvious that rarely is advice of counsel sought before opening an account; the
large majority of depositors will therefore rely upon their personal understanding of
what an account provides, or the advice of tellers.
5 For a comprehensive comparison of variations in the law of joint bank accounts,
covering all jurisdictions, see (generally) Kepner, The Johit and Survivorship Bank
Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. Rv. 596 (1953).
EFFECT OF JOINT ACCOUNTS
The appeal of the joint-survivorship account lies chiefly in a belief
that by its use the creating depositor will be enabled to withdraw his
funds throughout his lifetime as need or desire dictate, while at his
death the balance remaining in the account will vest in the named
co-depositor without the delay ordinarily incident to probate procedure.
Collateral considerations are provided by a wish to dispense with the
formalities requisite to making or changing a will, or a necessity to
provide a source of readily available cash during the period immedi-
ately following death.' To catalogue the purposes is to indicate the
problems. Immediately apparent is a transaction which, almost by
definition, attempts to circumvent substantive and procedural provi-
sions relating to testamentary disposition.'
In general, the most usual approach of courts confronted with a
controversy involving rights asserted under a joint-survivorship ac-
count has been to fall back upon one of four traditional common law
concepts8 to explain the basis of the right of the survivor to the fund
created; having done this, logically the body of substantive law
associated with the chosen concept will then be applied to the factual
situation at bar. Unhappily, the application does not always result
in a perfect fit.
Briefly, the most common theories employed to determine the
validity of the asserted transfer (most of which have been considered
at one time or another by the Washington court)9 are as follows:
Gift: Under this approach, the deposit by one party of his own
funds in a joint account with right of survivorship is looked upon as
an attempt to effectuate an inter vivos gift to the co-depositor. Ap-
plication of the settled principles of the law of gifts'" necessitates a
finding of intent to make a gift, coupled with a divestiture by the
donor of dominion and control over the subject matter of the gift.
A third requisite, acceptance by the donee, may usually be inferred
where the subject matter is by its nature beneficial to the donee."
6 The latter difficulty has been obviated to some extent in Washington by virtue of
RCW 30.20.020 (commercial banks) ; RCW 32.12.020(5) (mutual savings banks) ; and
RCW 33.20.080 (savings and loan associations) ; which provide, with some restrictions
as to persons and proof, for payment of limited amounts from accounts of deceased
depositors without requiring probate. Compliance with the statute provides acquittance
to the paying institution. These statutes do not deal with joint-survivorship accounts.
lJones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts As a Substitute for Testamentary Disposi-
tion of Property, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 42 (1955).
8 7 A.m. JuR. Banks § 426 (1937).
0 See, e.g., In re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940) (contract) ; It re
Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935) (joint tenancy) ; Daly v. Pacific
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 154 Wash. 249,282 Pac. 60 (1929) (gift).
10 BROWN, PERSONAL. PROPERTY § 37, at 84 (2d ed. 1955).
11 Id. § 50, at 146.
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The intent may be found by extrinsic proof" or, arguably, may be
inferred from the act of the original depositor in setting up the account
in joint form. 3 The necessity of relinquishment of control, however,
presents analytical difficulties; since the donor retains the right to
draw upon the account during his lifetime, he has not accomplished
that complete divestiture of dominion over the account which would
meet the substantive requirements of an inter-vivos gift at common
law. If the gift is thought to take effect only upon death, it of course
falls afoul of the Statute of Wills, as an attempted testamentary dis-
position lacking the formalities of execution required by the statute.
It has been suggested that the gift involved in a joint transaction
in reality consists only of a partial interest, in the form of a present
right to make withdrawals, together with the right of survivorship. 1"
The jurisdictions accepting this interpretation then relate the necessary
divestiture to the renunciation of exclusive control over the account."5
The above argument has been before the Washington court on at
least two occasions, neither of which, however, involved the current
statutes. In Meyers v. Albert" W claimed a community interest in
real estate purchased with funds (originally separate property of H)
deposited in the joint account of W and H. The court, applying the
common law requisites, refused to find an effective delivery in the
giving of a right to.withdraw from the account. The account involved
had been in an Oregon bank; hence the Washington statutes had no
bearing on the outcome of the case. The court in Daly v. Pacific Sav-
ings and Loan Ass'n"7 found no delivery, and therefore no passage of
title, to a joint account opened by a father in the names of himself
and son. The court said: "The fact that ... (the son) had a right to
draw upon the account did not pass title to him thereto from his
father, who supplied the funds upon which the son had a joint right
to draw." 8 The pertinent statute in effect at that time 9 was construed
to have as its purpose merely protection to the paying institution,
rather than the embodiment of a rule of property. That the present
statute applicable to savings and loan associations 0 extends further
12 Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 293 N.W. 841 (1940).
"3 In re Green's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 637, 283 P.2d 989 (1955). Contra, Daly v. Pacific
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 154 Wash. 249, 282 Pac. 60 (1929).
1.4 Kepner, supra note 5, at 598.
15 State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
16 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913).
'7 154 Wash. 249, 282 Pac. 60 (1929).
18 Id. at 252, 282 Pac. at 62.
19 Wash. Sess. Laws 1919, p. 499, § 5.
2o RCW 33.20.030.
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than a mere protective enactment appears from subsequent cases.
No case appears, however, which makes the present Washington
statute depend for its validity upon the common law theory of gift.
Trust: A second approach entails borrowing from a variation of
trust law. Proponents of this theory develop the idea that the original
depositor, by opening an account in joint and survivorship form, has
manifested an intent to vest in the donee an equitable interest in the
account, to become possessory at the death of the original depositor.
The difficulties in attempting conformation of this theory to the
realities of the situation are manifold, and it appears that only one
jurisdiction (Maryland) now subscribes to the trust rationale.22 Chief
among the criticisms leveled against acceptance of the trust theory
are the following: (1) the original depositor in the usual case has
no intent to constitute himself a fiduciary with relation to his donee;
(2) the depositor's right to withdraw and use the sums on deposit for
his own purposes does not correspond with the duty of the traditional
trustee with respect to the subject of the trust; (3) if the depositor's
intent in fact had been to create a trust, he could have done so by
expressly denominating the account to be such.2"
No Washington cases have been found which imply that any reliance
has been or will be made upon the trust theory to sustain the validity
of joint account transfers in this jurisdiction."
Contract: A third theory which has been utilized to determine the
property rights in a joint and survivorship account is based upon con-
tract principles. The typical rationale is grounded upon the contract
between the depositor as creditor and the bank as debtor. If the
depositor then orders the bank to pay to himself and to the order of
another, a contractual interest vests in the co-depositor as donee bene-
ficiary by virtue of the terms of the contract between the original
depositor and the bank."
21 In re Green's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 637, 283 P.2d 989 (1955).
22 Kepner, supra note 5, at 600, n. 16. It would appear that Maryland has a special
statutory provision which compels this result.
23 See, with respect to accounts expressly stated to be held in trust, RCVT 30.20.035
(banks and trust companies); RCW 32.12.030(2) (mutual savings banks); RCW
33.20.070 (savings and loan associations).
24 The variety of trust known as the "Totten" or "tentative" trust is not within the
scope of this comment, and is not discussed herein. For a Vasbington case involving
this concept, see In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956). See, (gen-
erally), I RESTATEBMNT, TRUSTS, § 58, comment b (2d ed. 1959). See also I re
Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
25 For a more detailed analysis of the operation of this theory in jurisdictions apply-
ing it, see Note, Joint Bank Accounts-Joint Tenancy-Survivorship, 8 0Io ST. L.




The principal weakness of the above reasoning centers in the diffi-
culty of applying contract law to get a property result. No transfer
of interest has actually been effected by creating a contractual right.28
Thus it would appear that, absent a statute, upon the death of the
owner-depositor his estate should be entitled to the balance in the
account, since nothing in the nature of "title" has ever passed from
the original depositor to the donee beneficiary. As one writer has put
it, "The bank credit belongs to the one who furnishes the consideration
for it, even if the contract with the bank entitles another to draw upon
that credit."2
Two variants relating to the effect of a contract in creating survivor-
ship rights should be pointed out. First, if a contract is found to exist
between the co-depositors which purports to create specific property
interests in the account, no conceptual difficulties arise. This position
has been sustained a number of times by the Washington court.2
Second, in dealing with the rights asserted to arise by virtue of the
"joint tenancy" account statutes, it would appear that the contract
between the debtor institution and the original depositor, creating a
joint account in statutory form, will in itself trigger the operation of
the evidentiary rules as to presumptive intent, which are built into
such a statute.29 This is a far cry, however, from an assertion of sur-
vivorship rights arising by virtue of such a contract per se, without
reliance upon a supporting statute.
Joint Tenancy: As a descriptive term, "joint tenancy" is commonly
applied to bank accounts held in two or more names. At common law,
however, the estate known as joint tenancy has, of course, a particu-
larized meaning, fraught both in creation and in effect with numerous
technicalities. The valid creation of an estate held in joint tenancy
at common law is dependent upon the unities of time, title, interest
and possession." If these unities are present, the "great incident" of
the tenancy, survivorship, automatically follows. The result is that
since both tenants, during life, hold the entire interest, the death of
one does not vest any new interest in the survivor; he holds what he
26 Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124 Wash. 495,214 Pac. 1047 (1923).
27 Rutledge, Joint Tenancy in Washington Bank Accounts, 26 WASH. L. Rnv. 116
(1951).28 In re Webb's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956) ; Tacoma Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Nadham, 14 Wn2d 576, 128 P.2d 982 (1942) ; In re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wn.2d
477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940).
29 In re Green's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 637, 283 P2d 989 (1955).
3014 Am. Ju. Cotenancy §§ 6, 7 (1938); 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3(a), (c)
(1955).
[VOL. 37
EFFECT OF JOINT ACCOUNTS
always had-the entire interest-now free of the possibility of asser-
tion of equal rights of the deceased tenant. 1
The dangers attending the application of a specialized term to a
generic entity become apparent, however, when one attempts to tailor
the specific requirements of common law joint tenancy to the practical
truths of a multiple party account. The unity of time may become
suspect in the not-uncommon situation where a depositor converts
a presently existing account into one which carries the names of
one or more co-depositors. 2 The unity of interest is questionable
in view of the right of either depositor to withdraw the entire balance
without rendering an accounting. Possession too would seem to be
incompatible with the factual situation. If one of the unities were
found to have failed at the inception of the account, then that account
was never one held in true joint tenancy, and therefore the incident
of survivorship could never have attached. Further, if one or more
of the unities were to be destroyed (as, for instance, by assignment
to a third party), a severance would be effected which would end the
joint tenancy as such-thus also destroying the right of survivorship.
The above discussion, however, can become meaningful in a given
jurisdiction only when superimposed upon the statutory configuration
of that particular state. In Washington, survivorship as an incident
of joint tenancy was abolished by statute in 1885,'3 which statute, as
amended,34 remained in force until repealed in 1961 by the Joint
Tenancy Act."3 The "joint account" statutes have long been construed
as abrogating the earlier rule with respect to their specific subject
matter. It is questionable, however, whether creation by legislative
fiat of a right of survivorship as to accounts jointly held has had the
effect of revivifying the traditional common law estate of joint tenancy,
with the necessary annexation thereto of the adjunctive incidents of
that estate. Rather it is suggested that something less than this was
intended, and has indeed resulted, both by virtue of the wording of
the statutes themselves and by the constructive implications given
them by the court.
The relevant statutes, as currently in effect, are set out in full
below." All four provide in effect that a deposit made in statutory
31 it re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 36, 45 P.2d 45, 48 (1935).
32 Kepner, supra note 5, at 601.
33 Wash. Terr. Sess. Laws 1885 § 1 p. 165.
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 20, § 1.
35 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, § 4.
36 RCW 30.20.015. "Joint deposits with right of survivorship. After any commercial
or savings deposit shall be made in a national bank, state bank, trust company or any
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form becomes the property of the co-depositors as joint tenants with
right of survivorship. The statutes relating to commercial banks and
to mutual savings banks provide further that the death of one de-
positor shall raise a conclusive presumption of intent to vest title in
the survivor. If the presumption raised by the statute becomes con-
clusive only upon death, it follows that during the lives of the named
depositors the effect of the preceding language of the statute could at
most raise a rebuttable presumption as to intent. Therefore no inter-
vivos property rights are fixed by the statute, if evidence of a contrary
intent is introduced."
The savings and loan association statute"3 does not contain the
"conclusive evidence" language referred to above. In the case of
banking institution subject to the supervision of the supervisor of banking of this state,
by any person in the names of such depositor and one or more other persons and in
form to be paid to any of them or the survivor of them, such deposit and any additions
thereto made by any of such persons after the making thereof, shall become the property
of such persons as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and the same, together
with all interests thereof, in the case of savings accounts, shall be held for the exclusive
use of such persons and may be paid to any of them during their lifetimes or the sur-
vivor or survivors. The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of
fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which
either such bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of the depositors
to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in the survivor or survivors."
RCW 32.12.030(3). "After any deposit shall be made by any person in the names of
such depositor and one or more other persons and in form to be paid to any of them or
the survivor of them, such deposit and any additions thereto made by any of such
persons as joint tenants, and the same, together with all dividends thereon, shall be
held for the exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to any of them during their
lifetimes or to the survivor or survivors, and such payment and the receipt of acquit-
tance of the one to whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release
and discharge to such savings bank for all payments made on account of such deposit
prior to the receipt by such savings bank of notice in writing not to pay such deposit in
accordance with the terms thereof. The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the
absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding
to which either such savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention
of all depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in the survivor or
survivors." (Mutual Savings Banks).
RCW 33.20.030. "Joint tenants. Savings may be received by an association in the name
of two or more members as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In such case, pay-
ment to either member shall discharge the association from liability upon such savings
account and, upon the death of either of such joint tenants, the association shall be
liable only to the survivor or survivors." (Savings and Loan Associations).
RCW 31.12.140. "Joint tenants. Two or more eligible persons may jointly become
depositors or members in a credit union and such persons shall enjoy the same rights
as though the deposits had been made by, or the shares issued to, an individual member,
and unless written instructions to the contrary are given to the credit union relative to
such account, and written receipt thereof acknowledged by such credit union, any of
such persons may exercise the rights of ownership, transfer and withdrawal incidental
to such ownership without the other joint holders joining therein, and in the event of
death, the survivor or survivors may exercise all rights incidental to such deposits or
shares." (Credit Unions).
37 Winner v. Carroll, 169 Wash. 208, 13 P.2d 450 (1932).
38 RCW 33.20.030.
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In re Green's Estate, 9 the court construed the omission of such
language to mean that the presumption relative to the right of sur-
vivorship which arises out of the contract between the depositor and
the association is therefore rebuttable even after the death of the
first to die. Therefore it appears that as to savings and loan accounts,
the rights presumptively created by the opening of an account in
statutory form are subject to modification both inter-vivos and as to
survivorship, where evidence is shown of a contrary intent. In the
absence of such a contrary showing, the statute will be operative to
evidence an intent on the part of the depositor to vest the right of
survivorship in the named co-tenants.
A further qualification upon the absolute title of the survivor is
furnished by the proviso in both "bank" (as distinguished from savings
and loan association and credit union) statutes relating to the effect
of fraud or undue influence. It has been held"0 that where the named
co-depositor had procured the account to be opened by taking advan-
tage of the weakened physical and mental condition of the owner-
depositor, a mere agency for collection was created, despite the joint
and survivorship form of the agreement with the bank.
The impact of the community property laws upon the area of rights
incidental to joint bank accounts is a problem which has as yet re-
ceived no definitive solution by the courts of this state. In the case
of Toivonen v. Toivonen a wife sought to recover funds deposited by
her deceased husband in the names of himself and his father in a
joint account with a savings bank. The trial court had concluded that
the husband had no right to dispose of community funds by means
of a joint account in such a way as to deprive the wife of her com-
munity interest. The opinion on appeal quoted with approval the
holding in Winner v. Carroll2 which construed the savings bank act
(substantially the same as the present statute) as creating upon the
death of either depositor a conclusive right of survivorship in the sur-
vivor. However, the court, "assuming the correctness of the court's
view as to the want of power in the husband to deposit community
funds in a joint account, in the name of a person other than a member
of the community,"'" found it unnecessary to resolve the conflict, since
so 46 Wn2d 637, 283 P.2d 989 (1955).
40 It re Bush's Estate, 195 Wash. 416, 31 P.2d 271 (1938).
41196 Wash. 636, 84 P.2d 128 (1938).
42 169 Wash. 208, 13 P.2d 450 (1932).
43 Toivonen v. Toivonen, 196 Wash. 636, 642, 84 P2d 128, 131 (1938).
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it was concluded that the funds involved were in fact not community
but separate.
The case of In re Ivers' Estate" would seem to cast some doubt
upon the efficacy of community property concepts to prevail over a
joint tenancy. In that case funds constituting community property
were found to have been converted to joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship by virtue of the deposit agreements signed by the husband
and wife with the bank. The daughter of the deceased husband had
challenged the right of the surviving wife to exclude the bank accounts
from the estate inventory. It is to be noted that no statute was here
involved; the holding is based entirely upon the contract which the
majority of the court found to exist between the parties. 5 Four mem-
bers of the court dissented, saying:
Certainly it cannot be the law that husband and wife nmy open a joint
account, even in a mutual savings bank, with community funds, and
the property be transmuted the next day into the separate property of
one spouse upon withdrawal of the deposit by that spouse and a new
deposit, in his or her own name, opened in another bank."6
The hypothetical posited by the dissenters in the Ivers case was
closely paralleled by the facts of Munson v. HayeY' The wife in this
case withdrew monies from a joint account with her husband and
deposited them in a joint account with a third party. Here the rights
of the third party were asserted, not by virtue of contract, but directly
under a statute8 which was construed, by analogy to the mutual savings
bank statute, to raise only a rebuttable presumption of joint tenancy,
as to inter-vivos rights. The court went on to say,"9 "That presumption
was met and destroyed when proof was presented that the funds de-
posited were community property."
The last chapter to date on the question of community property
versus joint property is presented by In re Webb's Estate."' A single
man and a married man established a joint account to which both
contributed, their expressed purpose being to save toward the purchase
of a chicken farm. Upon the death of the single man, his co-depositor
44 4 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940) ; Comment, 16 WASH. L. REv. 105 (1941).
45 The case involved accounts in commercial banks, and predated the passage of
RCW 30.12.015.
46 it, re Ivers' Estate, 4 Wn.2d 477, 493, 104 P.2d 467, 474 (1940).
47 29 Wash.2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).48Wash. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 183.
49 Munson v. Haye, 29 Wn.2d 733, 743, 189 P.2d 464, 470 (1948).
50 49 Wn.2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956) ; Note, 32 WASH. L. REv. 66 (1957).
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withdrew the funds, claiming under the right of survivorship provided
by the deposit agreement. The court upheld his right so to do, basing
its holding, not upon statute, 1 but again upon the contract between
the parties as evidenced by the signature cards. The court then
stated: 1
2
... (W)here community funds have been deposited in a joint account
with a right of survivorship in a person not a member of the com-
munity and the deposit agreement is in all other respects valid, the
agreement will be given effect at least up to the point at which the
rights of the survivor might have to yield to the superior right of the
surviving member of the community....
Analytically and as a practical matter, this pronouncement perhaps
creates more problems than it solves. Taken with the intimations of
the prior cases, however, one may at least speculate that in the area
of joint bank accounts the right of survivorship accruing to a surviving
co-depositor by virtue of the form of the account may be less than
"conclusive" where such right collides with the policy embodied in
community property concepts. Such a result would be in harmony
with the general disposition of our courts to accord community prop-
erty a favored position in the law.
SUiMMAY
It appears well settled that as between themselves, parties may
contract with respect to the creation of a right of survivorship in a
jointly held bank account." If such an express contract is established,
there is no need to resort to statutory aid in maintaining the right of
the survivor to take the balance remaining in the account at the death
of the first to die.
If no express contract between the parties exists, resort must be
had to the relevant statute to determine what property rights will be
enforced. The statute itself would not appear to be determinative
of these rights, however. Consider the following forms in which con-
flict may arise, and the differing effect of the statute on the outcome:
(1) Where the contest is between the paying institution and the
estate of the first depositor to die, the statute, by virtue of its acquit-
'; The deposits had been made prior to the effective date of RCW 30.20.015. The
court held that the statute was not retroactive.
,52 In re Webb's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 6, 12, 297 P.2d 948, 952 (1956).
r
3 In re Webb's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956); In re Ivers' Estate,
4 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940). See generally 7 Am. Ju. Banks § 425 (1937).
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tance provisions, will be determinative of the question, since it provides
absolute protection to the bank for payment to a named survivor."
(2) Where the contest is between living co-depositors, the statute
merely creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to hold jointly."
Either party may defeat the claim of the other by a showing of a
contrary intent-for instance, it may be shown that the account was
opened as a matter of convenience to the depositor in facilitating
withdrawals.
(3) Where the contest is between representatives of the estate of
the first to die and the surviving co-depositor, and separate property
of the decedent is involved, the conclusive presumption of the statute
will operate to vest title in the survivor."
(4) Where the contest is between representatives of the estate of
the first to die and the surviving co-depositor, and community property
of the decedent is involved, indications are that the "conclusive" effect
of the statute may be modified by reason of a conflict with rights
established through the operation of community property principles."7
(5) A contest between a creditor of one co-depositor and the other
party named on the account has not yet been before the court.5" It
would seem that by analogy to the rule followed in inter-vivos disputes
between co-tenants, the presumption of equal interest created by the
statutes should be rebuttable, thus allowing the non-debtor party to
prove the intent was in fact to create only an equal right of with-
drawal, not a property interest. After the death of a depositor, his
creditors would have no further rights against the account, since
survivorship would obtain by virtue of the conclusive evidence pro-
visions of the statutes." An obvious complication could arise in the
case of a community creditor seeking funds deposited in a joint and
survivorship account by husband and wife. If such accounts, by their
form, change the character of the funds to separate property at the
54 Nelson v. Olympia Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 193 Wash. 222, 74 P.2d 1019
(1938).
55 Munson v. Haye, 29 Wn.2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).56 In re Webb's Estate, 49 Wn. 2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
57 Ibid.
58 Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047 (1923) involved an attempt by a
creditor of defendant to garnish a savings account maintained by an uncle in both
names, but was denied under facts which did not raise the precise issue.
59 Tax liability represented by state inheritance tax will not be avoided whether the
property passes by inheritance or by some form of survivorship. RCW 83.04.020. Nel-
son v. Olympia Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 193 Wash. 222, 74 P.2d 1019 (1938).
Cf. In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P2d 45 (1935) (decided before enact-
ment of the special tax statute cited above).
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inception of the account, they would be insulated from such creditors
if the husband were to die first. The better policy would appear to be
served by holding that the deposit itself does not operate as a convey-
ance of any interest in the account other than the right to make with-
drawals. Thus the status of the account could be established in terms
of the funds used in its creation.
CONCLUSION
The property results flowing from joint account statutes in Wash-
ington appear to create interests differing substantially from those
associated with the common law estate of joint tenancy. The ability
of either depositor to withdraw to the full extent of the account during
life, without accounting, is inconsistent with the theory of joint ten-
ancy that any type of destruction of a unity constitutes a severance.
In addition, since the opening of an account in joint form merely
raises a presumption of the character of the holding,6" it would seem
that an action to partition, associated with common law joint tenancy,
would result in proof of the original status of the funds, under Wash-
ington statutes, rather than the traditional concept by which each
party would hold the same interest as before, but in several form
rather than in joint form. The true force of the statutes, then, is not
to create a common law joint tenancy.6 Its effect has been described
as follows:
* . . the statute creates a right of survivorship in the balance upon
survival, but ... the preceding "estate" is not a joint tenancy in the
common law sense, there being no rights of severance. Further, a
deposit in the form prescribed by the statute raises only a presumption
of whatever kind of joint tenancy there isA2
EFFECT OF 1961 JOINT TENANCY ACT
Chapter 2, Laws of 1961 authorizes creation of joint tenancies
which, if formed in accordance with the requirements of the act, shall
have the incidents of survivorship and severability as at common law."3
It has been suggested above that joint accounts as currently constituted
under the existing statutes do not possess the attributes of common
law joint tenancy. It could hardly be contemplated that the new
00 Munson v. Haye, 29 Wn.2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
U' Holohan v. Melville, 41 Wn. 2d 380, 249 P.2d 777 (1952) (dicta).
62 Rutledge, Joint Tenancy in Washington Bank Accounts, 26 WAsH. L. REv. 116,
121 (1951).63 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, §1.
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legislation operates retroactively to reconstitute these accounts in a
different form. The act itself provides: "The provisions of this act
shall not restrict the creation of a joint tenancy in a bank deposit
or in other choses in action as heretofore or hereafter provided by
law .... ,," (Emphasis added) Therefore, the intention appears clear
that the present joint account statutes are to retain their sui generis
character. No authorization for a change in status is afforded by the
act, and no reason suggests itself to anticipate a contrary construction
by future court action.
VnGNA B. LYNEss
64 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, § 3.
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